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ABSTRACT
A review of the design philosophy and development experience of fuel cell power generation and
cryogenic reactant supply systems is presented, beginning with the state of technology at the conclu-
sion of the Apollo Program. Technology advancements span a period of 10 years from initial defini-
tion phase to the most recent Space Transportation System (STS) flights. The development program
encompassed prototype, verification, and qualification hardware, as well as post-STS-1 design
improvements. The review is concentrated on the problams encountered, the scientific and engineering
approaches employed to meet the technological challenges, and the results obtained. Major technology
barriers are discussed, and the evolving technology development paths are traced from their concep-
tual beginnings to the fully man-rated systems which are now an tntegral part of the Shuttle vehicle.
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Minimal energy requirements of the earliest spacecraft permitted the use of batteries for
electrical power. However, for longer, higher power missions with energy requirements in the hun-
dreds of kilowatthours, the fuel cell has obvious performance and weight advantages which enhance
payload carrying capability. During the past 20 years, this potential for better pe_omance and
-reduced weight has spurred electrochemical technology toward substantial increases in current density
{amperes per square fopt) and life, with concurrent decreases in specific weight {pounds per
kilowatt) (ref. I) as shown in figure I. At the same time, increasing fuel cell reactant storage re-
qulrements for longer missions and higher ener_ production rates created a corresponding need for
improved performance in reactant cr_nlc storage. Dis need provided the driving force for the _-
velopme_ of more sophisticated cryogenic storage techniques {ref. 2). Additionally, the practical
application of these systems in advanced spacecraft was contingent upon the availability of necessary
component technology for controlling fluid pressures and temperatures, for regulating heat- and
mess-transfer processes, and for measuring fluid quantities. These growing requirements motlvated
significant advances in component technology in both the fuel cell and the cryogenics areas.
One of the most interesting combinations of these technologies is the Space Shuttle fuel cell
and reactant supply system, which Is the power workhorse and sole primary electrical power source for
the Orbiter vehicle (refs. 3 to 5). Dis system is a highly efficient power generating system Bat
produces electrical power by the electrochemical conversion of hydrogen (Hy) and oxygen (02) to
potable water. Additionally, the reactant supply system provides breathing oxygen for the crew.
Dis fuel cell and cryogenic system represents a major technological advance over that used for the
Apollo missions. The fuel cells used in the Orbiter Columbia's original flights are 50 pounds light-
er than and deliver as much as eight times as much power as the Apollo powerplants. A weight compari-
son to a battery system would indicate that today's adv)nced batteries would weigh about I0 times as
much for the same amount of energy, and weight of the most readily available, or "off-the-shelf,"
batteries would be as much as 25 times greate_ than that of this fuel cell/cryogmnlc system combina-
tion. The subsequent a_Itlon (effective for the ninth Space Transportation System flight (s_-g)) of
a third substack of cells to each Orbiter powerplant further improves the specific weight picture and
assures a lifetime I0 times greater than that of the Apollo powerplant. The Shuttle reactant storage
tanks are essentially scal_-_ Apollo-tpe tanks, but they are far superior to the Apollo tanks In
that they contain significantly improved insulation and support schemes. Moreover, the reusabllltv of
the tanks and the technical challenges thereby presented are particularly important for this paper
(ref. 6).
Accordingly, in-this report, the status of the fuel cell and cryogenic technologies at the con-
cluston of the Apollo Program is summarized, and the predeveloment technology activity which contri-
buted substantially toward the formation of a ftrm technology basis for the Space Shuttle Program is
discussed. Relevant technology issues are investigated, and the most significant innovations are
noted. The manner in which the lessons learned from Apollo and pre-Shuttle technology programs were
directly applied to the Shuttle development program is shown. Finally, major achievements tn the
test and evaluation programs supporting Orbiter development are discussed, and flight experiences
are described.
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FIGURE 1.- NASA FUEL CELL TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES.
. BACKGROUND
STATE OF TECHNOLOGY AT APOLLO PROGRAN CONCLUSION
The end of the Apollo Program marked the achievement of significant milestones in the develop-
ment history of fuel cell power and cryogenic reactant supply systems. The flight-proven Apollo sys-
tem could generate electrical energy at the rate of approximately 2 kilowatts for 14 days, with an
available peak power of more than 4 kilowatts for limited periods of time, _hlle supplying potable
water and metabolic oxygen for a crew of three. This system consisted of three fuel cell powerplants
of the Bacon cell technology, with accompanying supercrltically stored hydrogen and oxygen reactants.
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In the early 1960's when it was chosen for Apollo, the technology state of this fuel cell con-
cept was extremely low, and many developmental difficulties were encountered from the beginning of
the program (ref. 7). Although many of these problems were solved, some were merely "fixed" uslnq
workaround techniques because of the pressing schedule. This approach resulted in many inherent
system design difficulties and features which made the fuel cell sensitive to operator error and
necessitated the use of more co_q)licated operational procedures than desired.
Initially, problems were encountered with pressure sealing in the 500O-F potassium hydroxide
(KOH) environment. Also, a lightweight, long-life pump and water re_val system which would oper-
ate satisfactorily in a 60-psi, 200O-F wet-hydrogen environment was needed. A highly reliable low-
power coolant p,-,,ipwhich could function well in a thermal vacuum environment at temperatures from
-400 F to 1400 F also had to be developed.
Contamination and corrosion in fluid flow loops with critical hardware tolerances were serious
problems for many spacecraft systems and the fuel cell was no exception, as evidenced by sluguish
valves and pun_)s failing to start. These difficulties were overcome mainly by improved servicing and
operational procedures; material or design changes (or both) were made when there was no other means
of dealing _th the problem. Other problems with valves, accumulators, cell separation, and internal
cell shorting were met and dealt with during the component development, production, and ground test
phases of the program. As the production phase of the program was begun, a new set of problems
evolved. Careful attention was needed in areas of process control, servicing, spares production, and
traceability to ensure reliable flight-qualified herdwar,e.
Although the actual @k_ollo space flights were relatively free of fuel cell failures, two classic
fuel cell probl_ discovered in flight are worthy of note. The first involved air and particulate
contamination trapped in the coolant system in the normal-gravity servicing environment. In low- or
null-gravity conditions, the gas and particles freely migrated through the fluid loop and resulted
in coolant pump cavitation and reduced thermal control capability. Improved servicing procedures
precluded recurrence of the problem in later flights. The second problem involved condenser exit
temperature oscillations occurring first in lunar orbit and found to be caused by a low-gravity,
two-_ase flow instability manifested only under certain powerplant operating conditions. Complex
mathematical models and extensive In-_use testing were required to characterize the instability
and to _antlfy the operating conditions at which it occurred, so that valve schedule _anges
could be devised to accommodate this Idlos_cracy of the system (ref. 8).
At the end of the Apollo Program, a much Improved cryogeniQ-reactant storage system over the on)
originally conceived was seen, partly because of the Apollo 13 oxygen tank failure (ref. g). Although
low-gravity, two-phase fluid handling problems were avoided through the use of supercrltical storage,
development problems occurred early in the Apollo Program with insulation, heaters, pressure vessels,
fans, and other colq)onents (ref. 10). These difficulties were resolved largely through design modi-
fications and changes in hardware suppliers, and through tighter control of manufacturing orocesses,
techniques, and quality. Other problems that developed during the flight phase required some rede-
sign and requalification of flight hardware, but, overall, the state of technology in supercritical
cryogenic storage supply dewars was advanced significantly during the Apollo years.
In the area of dewar insulation, significant design innovations involving multilayer insulation
schemes with an embedded vapor-cooled shield were introduced during Apollo. Early insulation schemes
were completely load-bearing, but excessive heat leak led _o the use of semi-load-bearing insulation
straps encircling the hydrogen pressure vessel and contacting the pressure vessel at specific points
where the load is transmitted to a girth ring. _ "
Apollo heater design schemes started with an original static heater concept and settled on a fan
and heater combination which reduced system weight and minimized fluid stratification. After the
Apollo 13 incident, the fans were deleted from the oxgen tanks, and the performance of the resulting
static fluid heaters depended to a large extent on the effective gravity level.
Early pressure-vessel problems with the hydrogen tanks involved vessel failures due to room-
temperature creep in the titanium alloy (5 AI-2.5 Sn), titanium hydride formation, and resultant
spelling which caused vent-disconnect weld failures, and to problems encountered in the electron-beam
welding process. Resolution of these problems was accomplished by changes in materials and fabrica-
tion processes, and by improved weld specifications and quality control, including the use of a
borescope for weldinspectiom.
Major advances in the technology of other cryogenic components were seen by the end of Apollo.
Included were significant improvements in fan motor design and the development of better vacuum
potting techniques for the vac-ion pump package to prevent electromagnetic interference (EMI) and co-
rona effects.
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Three significant failures associated with the cryogenic storage system during Apollo had an im-
pact on the technology base. These were failure of the automatic pressure control system in a hydro-
gen tank (Apollo 9); loss of vacuum in a hydrogen tank annulus, detected during loading (Apollo 12);
and, of course, the Apollo 13 incident in which an oxygen tank failed in translunar flight. Through
a dlltgent effort on the part of the Apollo team, a successful recovery from each of these failures
was effected. Thus, at the end of the Apollo Program, significant technological improvements were
seen in cryogenic system design, particularly in pressure-vessel fabrication and weldtng, bimetallic
Joints, vapor-cooled shields in high-performance insulation, vacuum acquisition and retention, EMI
control, and metallurgical techniques.
In addition to the numerous system hardware technology advances, much progress was made in the
development of analytical modeltng techniques for electrical power and cryogenic storage systems
(refs. 11 to 14). Also, certain advances in electronics technology were ready for applicatfon
in future power systems. Collectively, these achievements constituted a firm technology base
from which the Space Shuttle development program could begin. ..
RELEVANT TECHNOLOGYPROGRAMSPRECEDING SHUTTLE
Although the Apollo system was satisfactory for its intended use, it nonetheless left much to
be desired as a means of power generation for future spacecraft. Even as far back as the days of
Apollo, the NASA Lyndon B. 3ohnson Space Center (.1SC), _ with awareness of the limitations of the
Apollo fuel cell design, initiated technology development program using NASA Office of Aeronautics
and Space Technology (OAST) fundtng with both the Allts-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and the
General Electric Company (GE). At that time, Allls-Chalmers was advancing the alkaline capillary
matrix concept, which held the promise not only of longer life but also of alleviating the severe
operational constraints experienced with the Apollo design. General Electric, on the other hand,
was continuing development on an early version of the acid solid polymer electrolyte (SPE) fuel
cell. The Allis-Chalmers concept was ultimately selected to be developed for the Orbital Workshop
in the NASA Apollo Applications Program (AAP) and for the U.S. Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory
(MOL). Later, the MOL program was canceled, and the Orbital Workshop concept was restructured and
renamed Skylab. At this point, for economic reasons, a programmatic decision was made to use exist-
tng Apollo fuel cells for Skylab. These two events led to the curtailment of a11 Allis-Chalmers fuel
cell activities. The Power Systems Division (PSi)) of United Technologies Corporation, in recognition
of the Apollo design limritattons, had also b_n developing the alkaline capillary matrix technology,
which has become its mainstay for the Shuttle fuel cell. Mea_tle, a technological breakthrough
involving reactant prehumidlficatJon in the GE fuel cell made it a viable option for the projected
Shuttle Orbiter power_system.
Dur4ng this same time period, the Bendix Company had been chosen to build cryogenic storage
tanks for the Orbltal Workshop and the Garrett AIResearch Corporation was selected to provide tank-
age for the MOL. However, cancellatlon of both these programs halted this effort before any signifl-
cant technology advancements were realized.
By the close of the decade, although technological progress had been achieved in both fuel cells_
and cryogenic storage, much of it was fragmented and affected heavlly by programmatic decisions
outside the realm of these technologies. It was thus recognized in early 1970 that for the Space
Shuttle, additional technology improvements would be required. For this reason, JSC initiated a com-
petitive procurement activity with United Technologies Corporation and GE aimed at upgrading the
state of hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells for Shuttle needs (ref. 15). Addltionally, two technology
programs for advancing the state of the art in cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen storage vessels were
begun by 3SC with the Beech Aircraft Corporation', Boulder Division: the Oxygen Thermal Test Article
(0TTA) and the Hydrogen Thermal Test Article (HTTA) programs (refs. 16 and 17). At this time in the
early Shuttle conceptual definition, a cryogenic orbital maneuvering system (OMS) was being considered;
therefore, the vessels were sized for both OMS propellants and power reactants, as Well as for meta-
bolic oxygen. These programs brought about such improvements as silver-plated H-film insulation, S-
glass support straps, and a refined vapor-cooled shield. Concurrently with these fuel cell and cryo-
genic technology programs, _SC also initiated a cryogenic supply system optimization study, one of
the prlncipal obJectlves of which was to investigate the feasibillty of a totally integrated cryo-
genic fluid storage and supply system for the Orbiter that would provide fluids for propulsion, power
generation, and life support (ref. 18). After selection of the present solid rocket booster/external
tank combination in lieu of the all-cryogenic Shuttle, this acttvity was reoriented to a cryogenic
cooling study. Perhaps the most useful result of this work was the establishment of a comprehensive
data base for cryogenic system component design. This information was used extensively in the design
and development phase of the Shuttle reactant supply system.
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.TRMSITION TO THE SHU'rFLE ERA
6REATER DEMANDS THAN APOLLO
With the l'efocusing of "the space program to neer-Earth orblt followfng the lunar exploration
phase, plans merged for larger crews and increased activities with experiments and other flight
hardware. Thus, electrical power requir .ea_ents increased by more than an order of magnitude over the
modest levels of previous programs and produced greater demands for high-performance power generation
systems. With the emphasis on economy,'this objective could only be attained through extended life
and reusability. _The concept o'f reusability required high operational tolerance and flexibility to
achieve acceptable turnaround rates at launch and landtng sites. Furthermore, to optimize total
vehicle design, plans were laid for an increase in system integration for the Shuttle compared to pre-
vious spacecraft. Taken all together, these increased demands pointed up the requirement for a
quantum junq_ in technology over that of the Apollo Program. Fortunately, these needs had been
recognized earlier by fuel cell and cryogenic storage technologists and by the NASA OAST, and technol-
ogy development in both areas had been evolutionary, building up from modest levels beqtnning Just
after the Apollo design was frozen in the early sixties to the competitive technology programs of the
seventies resulting in the selection of the present Shuttle system. Through these programs, major
technological barriers were overcome and the fuel cell and cryogenic storage system was placed in the
enviable position of being one of the few systems truly ready, from a technology standpoint, for the
development program. The development effort was reduded to solving englneering problems, though not
at all insignificant, for which.'no major scientific breakthroughs were required. This state of tech-
nological preparedness earned for-the .power generation and reactant storage system the distinction of
being the only subsystem.which reached._he end of the originally defined Shuttle development program
on schedule and within the alloca.ted budget (ref. 19).
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS PRO6RAMS
+ .
The completion of 3SC's competitive fuel cell technology programs in 1973 marked the end of a
decade of significant accomplishments in fuel cells and cryogenic storage, and it was a time for re-
flection by the technical coamunity on the successes and failures of these programs during that brief
period before the Shuttle development program began. In retrospect, two things were clear to the
fuel cell and cryogenics experts who were to .be involved in the Orbiter project: (1) the features
of a power generation and reactant storage system that were to be avoided in the Orbiter design were
known from the Apollo Program and (2) technical risks in the development program could be minimized
by using certain techniques and ideas which had evolved from the technology programs. Most unwork-
able methods had by this time been elimi.nated, and feasible techniques had been found, for the most
part, to achieve the Orbiter goa)s-of increased life, higher power, improved operational flexibility,
and lower specific weight and _olume.
Two fuel cell approaches 'were successful: the PSD fuel cell, with its improved alkallne electro-
lyte matrix, and the GE fuel ce11, with its acid solid pol_er electrolyte and hydrogen prehumidifier.
Both of these concepts had undergone significant improvements during the competitive technology pro-
gram, and engineering models of each had been subjected to a 5000-hour test program, with small
stacks (four to six cells) and other components accumula_ng more than 10 000 operating hours.
Cryogenics specialists had reached a-simiIjr plateau in the development of reactant storage and
supply systems, and although it was generally felt that the basic technology (supercritical cryogenic
storage) would be adequate for the Shuttle, it was also agreed that certain improvements over the
Apollo technology would be required to satisfyhigher power levels, a different vibration environ-
ment, and requirements for increased operational flexibility and safety. High on the list of needed
improvements was a better method of loading the reactant tanks because of significant loading prob-
lems wlth the Apollo tanks and the larger fluid quantities to be handled on the Shuttle. Consequent-
]y, a clear need was established for 'greatly improved ground-support equipment (6SE) and operations.
The Apollo 13 incidenthad led to improved static heater pressurization systems, and much had
been learned about low-gravity thermal stratification and its effects in the oxygen tanks on later
Apollo flights. Insulation and pressure-vessel mounting improvements had been made as a result of
the OTTA and HTTA technology programs, and techniques were available to avoid the compressive, load-
bearing insulation scheme of Apollo. A simplified vapor-cooled shield which f_rther increased the
thermal efficiency of the hydrogen:vessel had+been:developed. Progress in electronics virtually as-
sured electrical control and protective circuitry for the reactant storage and supply system that was
greatly improved compared to the prey tous electromechani ca1 pressure-switch system.
When the technology and flight programs for the development of fuel cell and cryogenic reactan_
storage systems in the years preceding the Shuttle are reviewed, it is clear that the availability of
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the technology is attributable to the fatlures as well as the successes encountered in these programs,
and to the penetrating insight and attention to detail on the part of the technical specialists In-
valved. Although fundtng was modest in these areas COml)ared to other system tn the Shuttle program,
the combination of talented mmpower, in-house test capability, and well-plenned technology programs
was responsible for the "ready" technology state of these system at the start of the Shuttle devel-
opment progrm. A composite summary of these technology and development progrms ts shown tn figure 2.
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FIGURE 2.- FUEL CELL AND CRYOGENIC R_.ACTANTSTORAGE OEVELOPHENT AND TECHNOLOGYPROGRN_.
_E OEV_ PROGR_
TESTAm EV_.UATIONPROGPJV_
Unltke electrfcal power system development to the Apollo Progrl, which was richly endowed wtth
supposing analy_ctcal activity, the pr|nctpal development channel |n Shuttle fuel cell and cryogenic
system develop_t was tts test program. However, because of the tncreesed emphasis on economy in
the Shuttle program, the approach taken in the development phase for both the fuel cell and the _'_o-
gentc storage system Included a mintmum test program which would satisfy progrm requirements. This
test program consisted of element and cmN)onent suppllor tests, thermal vacuum tests, vtbroacousttcs
tests, and checkout tests tn the Orbiter, _rlth ftnal tnt_ated system checkouts tn the horizontal
flight test, the f11ght readiness ftrtngs, and the opermttonal f11ght test program (ST5-1 to 5T5-4).
Very early in the developemnt program, cell test work at the NASA Lefts Research Center resulted
tn a change from the ortgtnal platinum-palladium catalyst to the geld catalyst now used In all cells.
Thts change provlded Increased efficiency and thereby a significant system _elght decrease, since
po_orplant substacks could then be used tnstead of the three originally required for each fuel cell
power p| ant.
7O7
Early development fuel cell units of the compact capillary matrix type were the PCaB-I and the
PCaB-4. Tests of the PC8B-I led to many changes in the proposed Shuttle design, including the
innovative dual-feed oxygen system and Noryl end plates. The PCaB-I test program empha,lzed the need
for alined nubbins and other flow field changes.
Other tests performed at OSC also provided direction for the development program. One exemple
is the investigation of the cold cathode activation procedure, found to be beneficial through
early PSD testing, whereby the cells were starved of oxygen after shutdown by supplytngan theft
gas to the cathode, _th h_rogen on the anode, while applying a load to the system. This procedure
nrevented the 0.S-milltvolt per cell unrecoverable voltage lnsses associated wtth conventional
shutdown procedures and enabled accurate performance predictions, thus reducing 1:he rate of performance
degradation of the powerplant. Thts is one of the reasons the flight powerplants have performed
better than originally predicted from the quallficatton test results.
In addition to the designated qualiftcatto'n powerplants and development u_tts, two develomental
powerplants and some co,_)onent hardware were purchased by JSC for special tests and evaluations to
complement the mainstream development program. The 0512A fuel cell was a Shuttle prototype umit
consisting of one flight-configured, 3Z:ce11 electrlcal generating stack and a nonfllght accessory sec-
tion. This powerplant was tested at the JSC Thermochemlcal Test Faclllty, prlmarily to provide In-
sight into long-term thermal vacuum environment performance and degradation characteristics early in
the Shuttle develoment program (ref. 20). It successfully ran for 5000 hours _t a simulated Shuttle
average load of 4.5 kilowatts, wtth an average loss of less than 1 volt over this time period. In ad-
•dltlon to determining degradation characteristics, test engineers mapped the operating characteris-
tics of the powerplant for the full range of Shuttle conditions and evaluated power-up capabilities,
transient load responses, purge requirements, and diagnostic techniques. Procedures for starting
and stopping the powerplant were also developed and verified in thts program.
Another developmeflt powerplant, X708, was tested at _SC in 1978 (ref. _.I)to evaluate a fully
flight-configured Orbiter powerplant over various operating regimes at sea-level pressure and in a
thermal vacuum environment. Although there were minor differences, the stack was essentially identi-
cal to the present Shuttle fuel cell stack and consisted of two 32-ce11, power-producing stacks elec-
trically connected in parallel. The powerplant arrived at _C having approximately 2000 equivalent
hours of operation, and approximately 1000 equivalent hours were added in the course of the tests.
Such things as the effects of long periods of open circuit, postlanding cooldown, and short-term
hlgh power levels were evaluated. These tests confirmed operation within specification limits for
the sea-level and vacuum tests and were extremely useful in thermal mapping of the coolant loop
during the cooldown, high power, and open-clrcult tests.
Other fuel cell tests were perf_ at JSC on its FC-40 fluid breadboard test loop. An example
is the investigation perfomed to develop techniques and procedures for removing dissolved gas from
the fuel cell coolant fluid before vacuum filling the coolant system.
Although development problams in the fuel cell program could well be classlfied as "system
level" and "component level," it is perhaps more meaningful in this paper to discuss in some detail
the three most important problem areas from the standpoint of meeting and solving the challenges of
system development. The first important area was a water removal problem first evidenced in 1975 by
hydrogen pump seize-up during vibration testing of a pow_rplant simulator. A failure investigation
revealed impeller interference within the housing, as well as contamination inside the pump. Conse-
quently, the hydrogen pump was redesigned to i_lude a clrculating filter, increased clearances, and
a larger diameter impeller to maintain existing pumping capacity despite the larger clearances. The
redesigned pump-separator unit successfully completed vibration and other tests, and it was not until
the next 3_ar, when attitude position testing on development powerplant X707 began, that further
problems arose. Surge and stall problems occurred in the rlght-hand launch attitude tests. Investi-
gation revealed that impeller rim purging during stertup would eliminate surge and stall during right-
hand position starts and operation. This revelatlon led to the third-generation production pump,
which incorporated two purge ports in the impeller rim. Tests on this design revealed that purging
did not solve the surge and stall problem in the right-hand position during startup, and out of
this series of additional problems arose a fourth-generation, self-asplrated pump. Unfortunately,
this design did not eliminate the surge and stall problems. It was also determined during pump
testing that condenser backflow was sometimes experienced during certain expected launch acceleration
loac_ (-Z). The fuel cell specification was then changed to incorporate expected launch and landing
accelerations, and a condenser backflow investigation was initiated. This investigation resulted,
in 1978, in further pump development activity in which 10 design changes were made and, subsequently,
in a flfth-generatlon pump. The condenser backflow investigation also precipitated other changes in
the condenser inlet header and the condenser aspirator pickup points. The result of these changes
was the designation of "left-hand" and "right-hand" powerplants, according to their position, and
resultant orientation, in the vehicle. Aspirator suction tube kits were fabricated for field con-
version from the "right-hand" to the "left-hand" configuration. The redesigned condenser and fifth-
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generation hydrogen pump succe,_sfully completed all attitude tests as well as a 2OOO-hour qualifi-
cation test. In fabricating the redesigned condenser, it was observed that inadequate deburring
before the welding process left metal "burrs" inside the condenser which could have led to serious
contamination problems in the flow system had this problem not been corrected by tightening quality
control procedures. This quality problem is considered minor in comparison to the other problems
associated with the water removal system.
The second important fuel cell development problem occurred in the process of plating the
magnesium separator plates which provide the flow channels for the reactant gases and the coolant.
Magnesium was chosen for the plates because of its lighter weight, and it was used in the fabrication
of the hydrogen and oxygen plates as well as the coolant plates. To Isolate the magnesium from
water in the stack to prevent corrosion, it was necessary to cover these plates with a thin (1.5 rail)
layer of nickel. Then, to preserve electrical conductivity and to provide oxidation protection for
the nickel, a layer of gold 0.2 mil in thickness was electroplated onto the nickel coating. The
magnesium plates were first dipped in a zincate solution to promote adhesion Of an intervening layer
of copper, which was required by the industry-standard process to facilitate adhesion of the nickel
coating. The problem involved plating defects in the nickel layer, and was ultimately found to be
caused by insufficient process control and quality checks. Flow distribution requirements necessi-
tated the use of a complex waffle-pattern plate geometry, which contributed to the formation of tiny
blisters on the plate surface. These blisters were the result of a coating system breakdown which
exposed the magnesium. The industry-standard process, although well established for other applica-
tions, was found to be inadequate for this specific application. To complicate matters, two vendor
changes occurred in the manufacture of the finished plates during this time period. An investiga-
tion was then conducted which resulted in a better understanding of quality issues and requirements
in plate production and in improvement of vlsual and X-ray standards. After process control was
tightened, the improved inspection techniques helped in reducing scrap rates.
The third fuel cell problem of major import involved an abnormally high performance degradation
in the qualification unit. The specification require_nt for a fuel cell powerplant dictates a volt-
age regulation between 27.5 volts and 32.5 volts at the fuel cell terminals for loads between 2 kilo-
watts and 12 kilowatts. This specification applies in either a power-up or a power-down direction,
as well as in steady state, over a period of 2000 hours when the average load on the powerplant is
4.5 kilowatts. The qualification power profile is showo in figure 3(a), and these loads were to be
repeated for the qualification test until the powerplant had been operated for the required 2000
hours. At approximately 600 hours into the test, the powerplant fell below the 27.5-volt minimum re-
quirement during a 2-kilowatt to 12-kilowatt power-up transient as shown in figure 3(b). This figure
also shows performance losses at various steady-state power levels. It was decided at that point to
continue the test for the purpose of certifying the powerplant accessory section for the required
2000 hours, and this was accomplished. The powerplant accumulated 2061 hours, with 53 starts, before
teardown and analysis began. Meanwhile, because of this problem, production powerplants could only
be considered qualified for 600 hours, or the equivalent of about four Shuttle flights. An exhaustive
investigation was launched into the manufacturing history and build characteristics of the cell and
into multicell rig and powerplant operational differences to find the cause of the premature perfor-
mance degradation. The historical data search revealed that the performance decay was a function of
numerous extensive powerplant load variations, start/stop cycles, and extended operation between -
cycles. Additionally, the anode (H2 electrode) was suspected, since its volta_le decay was worse than
that of the cathode at high power levels. The post-test teardown confirmed thls suspicion, since
white calcium silicate deposits were found on the anode" surface and were Judged to be a primary
contributor to anode performance degradation._ Examination of used, new, and virgin electrolyte
matrix material (asbestos) showed significant quantities of calcium (as much as several percent)
in the asbestos material. Tests indicated that the calclum deposit transferred to the anode, where
it inhibited the hydrophobicity of the anode. Without hydrophobicity, the catalyst reactant sites
become excessively wetted by electrolyte, which masks reactant from the catalyst area and causes a
decrease-in performance. Cathode (02 electrode) performance was essentially unchanged from initial
conditions, although the occurrence of small (10 mY/cell) positive and negative shifts caused per-
formance changes from one start to the next (cathode activation losses). After the matrix material
was found to be the source of the calcium deposits, it was theorized that electrolyte volume changes
(i.e., a washing effect of electroly_e back and forth in the e_ectroly_e reservoir plate (ERP) as
a result of load changes and start cycles) provided the mechanism for calcium deposition. At this
point, a plan of action was initiated to develop methods for calcium removal. Adding cells to the
stack and even changing fuel cell vendors were options discussed. Tests on a two-cell stack using
new cells to investigate the high initial performance degradation and the effects of startup and
shutdown were initiated by JSC.
Approximately 1 year of intensive effort on the part of 3SC, its prime contractor, Rockwell In-
ternational, and the fuel cell manufacturer, the United Technologies Corporation PSD, was required to
solve this problem, and the solution came in the form of two processes. The first, an electrode
floccing process, consisted of adding a floccing agent to the colloidal dispersion of catalyst agent
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used to coat the surface of the electrodes. Use of the flocclng agent produced an electrode of more
uniform consistency, thereby minimizing cell-to-cell performance variations. The floccing process
was already in use in the PSD fuel cell developed for the U.S. Navy and in the NASA Lewis Research
Center fuel cells, and it was incorporated as a no-cost improvement in the Orbiter program. The
other process, that of leaching the asbestos matrix material to remove calcium impurities, involved
reacting the calcium in the mat_x with an organic acid and rinsing away the soluble reaction prod-
uct. Figure-4 is a comparison of original qualification powerplant performance with later perfor-
mance obtained after incorporation of the floccing and leaching processes. Here, individual cell
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performance is plotted at various loads for both powerplants. Although operating time is insuf-
ficient to accurately evaluate these cell process changes, NA._A expects powerplant life to reach
the 2000-hour goal _th the present two-stack configuration. This pewerplant is literally being
qualified in flight, and all units currently are at or above predicted voltage levels. One power-
plant has accumulated approximately 800 hours of flight operation with no noticeable degradation.
A further change later in the development program to a three-stack powerplant configuration was
implemented in response to increased power requirements for the Orbiter. This change provides two
avenues for additional operational flexibility, namely, longer life (NASA predicts more than 4000
hours) at a design average power level of 4.5 kt]owatts or higher load capability (15-kilowatt peak
per powerplant) for Shuttle missions. Figure 5 Is a comparison of the t_o- and three-substack
configurations for various steady-state powerplant loads.
Other fuel cell development problems, although significant, are considered relatively minor
in comparison to the three Just described in terms of impact to the program. These less important
problems are listed below the major ones tn table 1. The problems, the time of occurrence, the
causes, and the corrective actions taken are shown.
Cryogenic storage development testing was accomplished for the most part at the Beech Aircraft
C_poration, Boulder Division, where two test units, a dynamic model and a thermal test article, were
extensively utilized. The dynamic unit was used in the development of the girth ring, the support
straps, and the pressure vessel and to solve ftll and vent line problems. The thermal test article
was important In understanding the thermal-acoustic oscillation phenomenon and in the development
of calibration procedures for the capacitance quantity gage inside the tanks. These test units are
still in use today and have been used at 3SC for relief valve and fill and vent line testing.
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Engineering improvements in cryogenics were needed in four areas: tank pressurization, inner
vessel suspension, protective electrical circuitry, and GSE. The Apollo 13 incident had led to
improved static heater pressurization systems, and although internal and external pressurization
methods were being considered for the Shuttle, the general consensus was to maintain the internal
scheme used on Apollo but to use no fans in either the Shuttle hydrogen or the Shuttle oxygen tank.
Although the static internal pressurization tech_rlque had been flight-proven in the redesigned oxygen
tanks used on later Apollo and subsequent flights, the reactant fl_ demands of the Shuttle system
were approximately seven times greater than those of Apollo, and the increase caused a sharply higher
localized heat influx at the heater probes. For example, the maximum heat input to the single heater
probe in the redesigned Apollo oxygen tank was 150 watts. In the Shuttle oxygen tank, maximum heat
input is 1000 watts. For this reason, the heater element configuration was changed and two heater
probes are used in each tank as opposed to the single Apollo probe. The major unknown factors In the
pressurization area at the beginning of the tank development program were the degree of thermal strat-
ification expected in these larger tanks and the effects of stratification on system performance.
These unknowns were later quantified and understood in the course of the development and fll_t test
programs.
In remembrance of the problems encountered in the Apollo pressure-vessel suspenslon system, Shut-
tle designers _sed the increased knowledge gained in the OTTA and HI-FAtechnology programs by
choosing filament-wound S-glass support straps and using them in a tensile-loaded configuration, as
opposed to the Apollo compressive load-bearing insulation scheme. This choice eliminated not only me-
chanical problem caused by internal vessel rotation but also localized high-heat-leak areas through
the comressed insulatlon. Here again, the technology programs were rewarding in providing an
increased leveJ of intelligence for Shuttle development.
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TABLE 1.- PROBLEMS ENCOU;frlERED IN ORBITER FUEl. CELL DEVELOPMENT PRO6RN_
Problem Ttme frame Cause Correct 1re action
.:i'::3:÷,_::L!:::*
Mater rlmlova| system
I_ pump stall 197S Low t_ellfr clearance,
contm_natton tn
Right-hand launch attitude 197(;-78 Watee _11dup tn pump
st.all r_t
1981 Pump rlm aspirator
bleckecl by mall
forelg_ object; caused
progresslve fuel cell
floodln 9 wtth result-
hlgh 9H and vol-
tage loss
1974-75 Insufficient process
contro] and _ualtty
checks
1979-80 Calcium deposits on
_ode
STS-2 f_1 cell fallure
Ntcketpl_tin 9 (l_j plates)
Ptt_'fomant:t Oegrad|tton , quallftcitton
po_erplamt
Other
Pump redes_qn (fllter, Increased clecrance, larger diameter
meeller_
Impeller rtm purge poet arid Itsptrator trtstalllt_on, _mo
Current measurements, mJ_lseolwato_ redeslcfft, left-he.all
rt_t-hMtd Do_erplutts t|sptrator suction tube ktts)
Improved ¢ontmtnatton control; _m_ _'ebestge (ellm_nated
pump rm asptr|tor); matertal change (parts changed to
stainless); stainless sty1 ftlte_s
Imroved p_cess cofltrol tr_ plate p_O_Ctton _na *_roved
nondestructive evaluation techniques
Flocctng _nd leechtng
Dynamics (vibration) 1975 Allo_able comanche"
stress levels excee_ea
Condenser fabrlcation (burrs} 1982 L_k of puallty c_ntrol
In conde_st_" retroflt
_Sp_retor
-Themal control v|lves 1977 Contamination _n p_ston
relief sTot
198_ Themal expans_tm, e_-
traPlo_J flutd
Water tra_ 1979 Corrosion tn _ouslng *
m_tertal tncomputf o
b111ty
C_1_t pump selzu_ 1980 _1_t fluld e_tn_d
.Ith Increased t_er-
ature forctng can
_nto stator
D_al pressure regulator (venting) 1979 Contamination
Support 11net Idled, other ftxes _mplemtmted to reduce
StreSS levets
Marlufacturlng procedures revtsl_t to fnC1ude _ehurrlng;
condeflsers r_orked
Improved clean]nq _thods
Improved manufacturing requtrmeflts, groove redestan
fo_ 3-substeck fu_l c_11
Nateria1 chlmge - A1 to Incoeml N)O
Stltor can t_'forlted to _CCept _1_t _lume chan_
O_11ty ¢_mtrol t_eo_,ed
The optlmlzation techniques developed in the OTTA and HTTA technology programs led to the selec-
tion of double silve_zed Kabton multilayer insulation with nylon net spacers, although heat leak
minimization requirements were not as demanding because of planned hi_er reactant usage rates. Col-
lectively, these improvements resulted in significantly lower cost, complexity, and weight for the -
Shuttle reactant storage system.
A third major improvement in the Shuttle tanks compared to the Apollo tanks is in the electri-
cal protective circuitry. Each Shuttle hydrogen/oxygen tank set contains an electrical control box
(mounted on avionics cold plates), which contains differential current level detectors, control pres-
sure conditioners (CPC's), rmote power controllors (RPC's), control drivers, and the logic required
to control the tank heaters and to provide overload protection in case of heater fault.
The fourth itm requiring conslderable attention in the development program was GSE. In an ef-
fort to avoid the difficulties of loading the Apollo tanks, much consideration was given to the GSE
early in the program. As a result, larger lines," better insulation, and the absence of tank loading
problems were characteristics of the Shuttle program. At _SC and Beech Aircraft, hydraulic pressuri-
zation techniques were developed to pressurize the tanks after loading, and procedures were developed
at JSC to assure adequate reactant purity at filllng. These techniques and procedures resulted in
decreased tank loading times.
Although the reactant storage system development program was relatively smooth compared to the
fuel cell program, several problems were encountered. These problems can be loosely separated into
three categories: dynamics, thermel-acoustic phenomena, and fabrication techniques.
Dynamlcs (l.e., vibration) problems were of two types. The first - definition of the vibration
environment for the system - involved no hardware failures but has been an annoyance from the
beginning of the program to the present time. Because of the complex configuration of the
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interreacting support struts and straps with their multiple degrees of freedom, it has been virtually
impossible to perform an adequate dynamic analysis of the system to determine correct vibration
levels for dynamic testing. This difficulty has caused many changes in the test requirements, and this
issue is still not fully resolved, although the latest tank configuration has been certified for the
required 100 missions. The second dynamics problem was related to the first in that it was partly
due to a lack of understanding of the vibration environment, but was strictly a components problem.
Many components (e.g., tank heaters, capacitance probe, and vac-ion pomp) were failing when vibrated
to a level believed to be much more severe than that expected in flight. The support straps failed
because of fatigue, and the electrical signal-conditioning box almost completely disintegrated dur-
ing an early development test. The signal-conditioning box was found to be reaching a resonant fre-
quency on the girth ri,.gon which it was mounted, and vibration isolators were required to solve this
problem. The fill and vent lines cracked in the hydrogen tank, and this failure led to a complete
redesign of these lines in both the hydrogen and oxygen tanks. (The oxygen tank redesign is in work.)
Only the pressure vessel, the outer shell, and the tank's girth ring needed no modification after
vibration tests. Electrical problems occurred with transistors and diodes failing in the CPC. An
embrittlement problem arose in connecting the lead wires to the heater elements; this problem re-
quired a manufacturing process change. Thermal-acoustic oscillations discovered early in the pro-
gram in the hydrogen tank caused pressure change amplitudes of 20 _ 10 psi, which not only produced
problems for the pressure control system but also increased tank heat leak by 200 percent. To damp
these oscillations, an orifice was put In the fill line and the line was insulated. Extensive JSC
in-house testing resulted in both the discovery of this problem and the evaluation of the design fix.
Although extensive spark ignition tests had been '_performed in the Apollo Program to determine
minimum energy levels required for ignition of combustible materials in a high-pressure oxygen envi-
ronment, later discoveries in the 10 _ars following the Apollo 13 incident modified these results
somewhat. The most significant of these discoveries was that Teflon will ignite in this environment
at energy levels lower than originally expected. Extensive testing was performed on the Shuttle
signal conditioner to determine whether it was capable of delivering localized energies in the vi-
cinity of the capacitance probe (the only tank component containing Teflon) sufficient to produce
ignition. The results were negative and no changes had to be made to the system.
Another Shuttle development problem which constituted a significant challenge concerned the
manufacturing process for the pressure vessel. To complete a pressure vessel, its two preformed
hemispherical shells are clamped together carefully at many points and, after precision alinement
and measurement checks, the hemispheres are welded together. Because no problem was suspected, the
measurements originally were not rechecked after the welding process was completed. Later, discovery
of pressure-vessel mismatches caused concern for the integrity of the vessel. An additional qualifica-
tion test was run on a pressure vessel with a known severe mismatch, and, following this test, the
vessel was subjected to a burst test which proved that excessive mismatch did not cause burst pres-
sure problems. Tanks currently are being flown with a lower degree of mismatch than that of the
burst-test specimen, but two significant corrective actions have been initiated. The first was a
procedural modification requiring recheck of the vessels for mismatch after welding is complete.
The second corrective action involved the development of an ingenious nondestructive evaluation
(hOE) procedure to X-ray for pressure vessel mismatch on existing tanks, viz, completely fabricated
tanks with an outer vessel. Considerable cost savings were realized using this procedure, since
not all tanks have the mismatch problem.
Table 2 is a summary of major reactant supply system development problems, the time frame in
which they occurred, the determined cause, and the corrective actions taken. This table, as with the
comparable fuel cell table presented earlier, _ not intended as a complete problem list but only to
highlight some of the most challenging problems encountered in the program.
Although testing and evaluation is continuing on such issues as certification of empty reactant
storage vessels for launch, fuel cell startup heater design issues, and higher-than-anticipated vibra-
tion levels in flight, a technological plateau was reached in 1981 when both the fuel cell and cryo-
genic systems were declared ready for the first orbital flight test. From this plateau, one could
look back down the steep slope representing the challenges which had been overcome in bringing these
two systems to a state of flight readiness. Many improvements had been made in these systems
since the Apollo Program. A comparison of the most significant characteristics of these Shuttle
systems with those of Apollo is shown in tables 3 and 4. The pause at this plateau was brief,
however, because on April 12, 1981, the launch of STS-1 signaled the beginning of a new era of
developmental flight testing in the early Shuttle flights which held still more surprises.
FLIGHT EXPERIENCES
In the first four development flight tests, several problems were encountered in the fuel cell
and reactant storage systems. Only one of these problems could be considered major, that being the
STS-2 fuel cell failure. This problem was traced to contamination in the water removal system. It
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TABLE 2.- Pi_OBLEM_ ENCOUNTERED IN SHUTTLE REACTANT SUPPLY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Problem Time freme Cause Corrective action
Envlrorlsental
.L_:::>:,3(%'_
]nedequate tank/cceponent
vibration enviromlent
d_Inition
Component vlm)rit$on failures
lg74-present Cmp]es conftgurstton;
aulttple degrees of
freedal
1974-80 [rodequlte component
vibration errvtronmnt
definition led to
overly severe test
conditions
1977-78 Thermal instabilityThernml-ecoustlc osc1111tions (H2)
[leCtrlca]
Vlbrltlon re_Ir_nts _dlfled by f11ght test data
Redestgn of scan components (e.g., fill/vent 11ros);
retest of others at reduced vibration levels; vi*
bretlon isolltors
[nst_lled ortfice in the fill line and improved Insulation
on H2 and 0 E fill and ve_t lines
Control pressure conditioner lga0-present Cold solder joints, on- Component redesign and improved _nufacturtng techniques
-._ .-.L:_,i-:<.7_3
Reactant va1_ witch
H 2 s_.off va1_ lend wlre short
02 shutoff vllv_ short
Signal condttloror c_bustton hazard
potted fl Iters
1977 Excessive voltage drop
aCTOSS ¢ofltacts
1977 Wire _nti_ _th va1_
¢ovor durl_ mIdlng
t
1976 Sharp bends in wires.
Insulatlon filled,
ceu$tng shot t t n_
1979 PotentiAl shorting
-I_ capacitance probe
Manufecturin( I
Revised manuficturlng procedures
Improved inspection techniques
Wtrtng and Insulation redesign
Pe_fomed hazard analysis and eddttlonal _rf-ltmtts testlng
to prove adequacy of design and to deftne design rMrgtns
Heater wire om_IttlINnt (H 2 te_) 19B_
(sis-4)
Pressure vemsel Iltmt¢_ 1980-81
HI_ stresses developed
during htgh-tempur*
ature annealing and
gold hrue operations,
clusteg eabrtttloment
Welding Process fur
bemtspherem Introduced
et'r'urs; not rechecked
after welding
]r_trumentatton
Design changes tO eliminate heater stress concentration
bones; improved inspection techniques
Improved clim_teg procedures; began using improved rndio-
phtc technic_e to detect mismatch on exts_tng vessels
hose produced before the problem waS discovered)
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Hz quenttty transducer shift
0) quantity transducer shift
H2 _anttty gege off-scale high 198_ (_TS-3)
0 Z PreSsure transducer 1976
Control logic failure tn Hz T-O 1981
valv"
Unresolved to date
Suspected shift in
calibration; cause
u_resolved to date
T_ stmultanlou$ o_en-
ctrcutt ccmdlttons in
[Hi filter sections of
signal conditioner
Transducer Instability
Hz T-O valve control
logic defective . -
Tank depletion can be tracked by quantity Comparison wtth
other t_ks and known fuel cell usage
Some aS H 2 transducer
Revised reditr/tnsdectton techniques
Revised lccl_tance test procedure
Valve replaced, control logic revised
was found that the hydrogen pump was not operating properly because of contaminant blockage of the
pump impeller rim aspirator. The blockage caused water backflow through the pmnp rim Into the hydro-
gen discharge port and eventually all the way to the power section and flooded several cells. This
problem resulted In yet another redesign of the hydrogen pmep and the water removal system. Included
were material changes, the incorporation of filters in the water removal section of the pump, and the
elimination of the hydrogen p_,nprim aspirator in favor of a passive recirculation system. Also,
ground checkout monitoring of pump current was eeq)haslzed. No further problems have been experienced
with this system. A three-substack fuel cell powerplant has also been produced; this unit has recently
completed qualification testing and will be flown for the first time on iTS-g. The redesigned hydro-
gen pump was installed on the three-substack powerplant and qualified along with the powerplant
after successful completion of powerplant qualification testing. Other fuel-cell-related flight
problene; include reactant flo_meter malfunctions and a shift In thermal control set points. Both
of these are minor by co_q)arlson to the hydrogen pump problem, and design or process changes have
remedied both problem.
The reactant storage system has performed well on all flights through STS-7 with few problems,
none of which caused a mission cm_remlse. The heater wire embrittlement problem, thought to have
been solved earlier, did recur on 5TS-4, resulting in a powered-down heater mode for entry, but per-
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TABLE 3.- COf_ARISON OF SALIENT APOLLO AND SHUTTLE
FUEL CELL CHARACTERTSTICS
Characteristic Shuttlea 'i
27 to 31 27.5 to _.5 i,_'.;/;il;;'.._
 ,cated radiat IntegretedwithvehicleATc 
Net powerpla_ output, steady state
Min-mx, kW ..............
Average, kW ..............
Voltage, V ................
Thermal control .............
In-fl Ight restart capabl l Ity .......
Restarts allowed .............
Reactant purity required (by volume) ....
Powerplant life, hr ...........
Powerplent weight, Ib ..........
Powerplant specific weight,
Ib/kW .................
Curren_ density at average load,
A/ft_ .................
Cost
Development program, million
dollars c ................
Production powerplant, million
dollars c ................
NO Yes "_ '-" ::" "'" ;
./A sostartswith maint.ence !:'
125 starts wtth maintenance _::"_;.": ..,.;:::
t,..,., :.::.. :J • :
,,O.999_0.99995 00"99989.99990 _':::":'J:' " i'"- '"
400 2000 wtth no maintenance _::(;::":"".
SO00 with maintenance ;-.:.'_".::.i."'-:i,
245 202 _ .... •
270 2q ; :"_.:i',: _ ::%
90 230 _:::_ :;:::.f.
• ... :.- .....
61.1 22.6 (through 0V102)
1.2 2.2
aTwo-substack powerplant.
bActive thermal control system (Freon loops).
CApollo costs in 1971 dollars; Shuttle costs in 1982 dollars.
formance remained nominal with no mission tmpac_.. This problem is under investigation, but because
of extensive ground checkout, an extrememly low fatlure rate, and an adequate amount of redundancy to
cover uncertainties, no fltght impact has occurred. Only two other cmponent failures have occurred
in the flight program (excluding random instrumentation failures): are mote power controller and a
hydrogen quantity gage. The RPC problem was traced to an electrical problem and resolved, and the
quantity gage signal conditioner was replaced (l_tce) to preclude recurrence. The tank pressure con-
trol system works consistently, with no control band drift from flight to flight. Campared to the
Apollo pressure control system, the Shuttle system is very sophisticated. It allows predelivery
setting of the pressure control band higher for selected tanks, with all tanks in the "auto" position,
to avoid call up requtre_w_nts to the crew for manual tank management. Occasionally, pressure drops
of as much as 100 pst in the oxygen tanks, caused by destrattftcatton, have been observed during
vehicle maneuvers, but these cause no concern since the tank operates at a pressure near 900 pst a
and the fuel cell minimum pressure requirement is 100 psta. Other minor problems that have occurred,
primarily instrumentation problems, are not mentioned here. Review of flight data for the $TS-1 to
STS-4 missions revealed tank vibration levels which were higher than expected during ascent. This
revelation necessitated certain mdtftcations to the oxygen tank fill ltne and resulted in a rede-
sign and certification of the tank for the mre stringent dynamic environment.
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Characteristic Apollo Shuttle
Tank capacity (100% quantitY),
lb ................
Tank heat leak at dQ/dm mln,
Btulhr ......... .....
Flow rate at d_/dm mln, lblh_ . . .
Insulatlon .............
Vapor-cooled shield ........
Structural support .........
Reusability ............
Tank operation control .......
Heater protection .........
Tank weight, lb
H2 ..............
o2 .... ::.
Cost
Development program, m111ton
dollars c ............
Production tank set (two tanks),
m111ton dollarsC ........
29 H2a
330 02
7
0.07 _.73
Aluminized Mylar
'02 (limited)
H2 (forerunnerto Shuttle)
Compressive
" 02: load bearing
H2: par£1y load bearing
None
Pressure switches
Fuses
Stainless steel sheath
(02: static)
g2 H2b
781 02
6.7 H2
.' 20 02
0.07 H2
O. 62 02
Sllverlzed Kapton with nylon net
02 - not required
H2 - simplified
Tensile
Epoxy-impregnated
S-glass support straps
100 missions
Cryogeniccontrol box
(electronic)
Differential current level detector
Oouble stainless steel sheath (02)
High-emissivity coating
gl 227
80 215
15.1 14.4
aApollo baseline: before Apollo 14 - two tank sets (H2 and 02); after Apollo 14 - three tank sets.
bShuttle baseline: two tank sets, but as many ms ftve complete tank sets can be installed below
payload bay liner.
CApolIo costs in 1971 dollars; Shuttlecosts in 1982 dollars.
CONCLUSION
Looking back on the vast amount of activity occurring from the early days of the technology pro-
grams to the present time, peaks of accomplishment stand out tn meeting the challenges faced in
developing the present fuel cell and reactant storage systems. These accomplishments include ma_or
advances inelectrochemtcal technology, significant mechanical and electrical improvements, much prog-
ress fn dynamics and themal engineering, and major breakthroughs tn nondestructive testing and
manufacturing techniques. Many of these achievements can be traced directly to the NASA
predevelopment technology programs.
Collectively, the doclstons and efforts of a large number of design and development experts,
test engineers, project personnel, and subsystem managers, under the direction of the Orbiter Project
Manager, have successfu)ly guided the development of these two Shuttle systems through many problems.
717
Thissuccesswas the result of a dedicated team effort by all involved, both NASA and contractor per-
sonnel. All should be proud that the challenge has been met and major difficulties overcome to pro-
duce the systems which are flying in the Shuttle Orbiter today.
In summary, no failures have occurred in flight which have compromised either crew safety or mis-
sion success, although the STS-2 fuel cell failure did cause this mission to be shortened to preplanned
minimum mission guidelines; however, more than gO percent of all high-priority flight tests were accom-
plished (ref. 22). The STS-2 mission incident'also demonstrated important "designed-in" operational
capabilities in the presence of a significant subsystem failure. From this standpoint, it can be
concluded that these systems have performed well. Development problems still exist, however, which
are being diligently worked on at the'present time (examples are cryogenic tank heater wire embrit-
tlement and fuel cell startup heater failures in ground test). Because of this continuing effort,
future flights should be even safer and better from an operational standpoint. As in any high tech-
nology area, f_rther improvements may be required and problems as _et unforeseen may arise in the
future, and we must remain prepared to face these new challenges.
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